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CASE NOTES

The Court went on to say, that since the state was relying solely on the
repudiated confession of the defendant, justice demanded that the third
party's confession be received. It is also interesting to note that the
declarant was not shown to be dead, as required by the Bartlett case. Since
the only subsequent case that considered the exception in Illinois3 7 was
concerned solely with a declaration against a pecuniary interest, it is still
a moot question whether the Lettrich case will be confined to its particular facts.
In conclusion, it is submitted that a declaration against penal interest
cannot be treated in the same manner as a declaration against pecuniary
interest. If the confession of every crackpot (and such are not uncommon
in cases of wide notoriety) were held to be admissible, the issues before
the jury would become a hopeless morass. However, the refusal of the
majority jurisdictions to admit penal declarations, even where it would
seem that justice demands a departure from the orthodox rule, is untenable. The rational rule, it would seem, is the minority rule.
37

Haskell v. Siegmund, 28 111.
App. 2d 1, 170 N.E. 2d 393 (1960).

INSURANCE-CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY BY WILL
Plaintiff's son brought an action against his mother claiming the right to
the proceeds of two group life insurance policies. The policies, taken out
by John Suga, father of the plaintiff and husband of the defendant, named
the defendant as beneficiary. John Suga died testate, however, and his will
bequeathed the proceeds of the life insurance to the plaintiff. The policies
provided for a change of beneficiary by any written request filed at the
headquarters of the employer or home office of the company; such change
was to be effective as of the date of execution of the request, whether the
insured be living or not at the time of the filing, but without prejudice to
the insurer. The insurer, previously joined, was dismissed upon payment
of the proceeds to the clerk for deposit. Plaintiff argued that the unique
wording of the policy permitted change of beneficiary by will, and that
the court effectuate his father's intent. The decision in the lower court for
the defendant was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court. The basis of
the decision was that where the policy regulates the method of change, such
method is generally exclusive to that extent. Furthermore, it was held
that the widow's rights vested upon the death of the insured; the request
for change must be made during the lifetime of the insured, and the will
was ineffective until after death. Suga v. Suga, 35 111. App. 355, 182 N.E.
2d 922 (1962).
Generally, if there is no restriction or exclusive method for changing
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the beneficiary, nor a method prescribed, a change of beneficiary by will
may be sustained.1 The plaintiff in the Suga case argued that the policy
has no such restrictions so that this rule could be applied. But the court
based its judgment on another rule, that the right to change is sometimes
denied as a theoretical impossibility, since the proceeds vest in the named
beneficiary upon the death of the insured. 2 The rationale of the vesting
theory is that the insured has a right to change the beneficiary only during
his lifetime. Since a will is not effective until death, a change of beneficiary in a will is not a change made during the lifetime of the insured. 3
No change being effected before death, the proceeds become vested in
the named beneficiary immediately upon death; they do not become part
of the estate and cannot be left by will.4 The result is the same, whether
the court considers the beneficiary's interest vested but subject to divestment (by proper change during the insured's lifetime) or contingent until
the interest becomes vested."
In support of the theory that the vesting of the proceeds make a change
of beneficiary by will impossible are two supplementary arguments. The
first is that the rule protects both the insurer and the public. As stated in
one case, "on the proposition of non-prejudice and actual protection of
the companies in the instant case ... the case must be decided by the rule
and the rule cannot be altered to fit the case." 6 The basis of this argument
is that if the proceeds are permitted to be passed by will, the insurer may
pay the designated beneficiary and subsequently face a claim by the
legatee.7 Since it is in the public interest to have expeditious payment and
disbursement of proceeds, and since any other rule (it is argued) would
bring litigation, confusion, and delay, any attempt to change the beneficiary by will is considered ineffectual.8 In logical counterpoise to these
arguments, it has been correctly stated that the insurer can always demand
compliance, pay the designated beneficiary, and not be hurt.9
15 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW

146 (2d ed. 1959).

2 1bid.
8 Stone v. Stephens, 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E. 2d 766 (1951); Cook v. Cook, 17 Cal.
2d 639, 111 P. 2d 322 (1941).
4 Thatcher v. Conway, 296 S.W. 2d 790 (1956); Parks' Ex'rs. v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435,
156 S.W. 2d 480 (1941).
5 See Strohsahl, Exr. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y., 71 N.J. Super. 300, 176 A. 2d
814 (1962).
6 Parks' Ex'rs. v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435,444,156 S.W. 2d 480 (1941).
7 Wannamaker v. Strohman, 167 S.C. 484, '166 S.E. 621 (1932); followed in Stone v.
Stephens, 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E. 2d 766. (1951); Parks' Ex'rs. v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435,
156 S.W. 2d 480 (1941).
8 Strohsahl, Ex'r. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y., 71 N.J. Super. 300, 176 A. 2d 814
(1962).
9 Pedron v. Olds, 193 Ark. 1026, 105 S.W. 2d 70 (1937); See also Stone v. Stephens,
155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E. 2d 766 (1951) (dissenting opinion, Zimmerman, J.).
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The second argument in support of not allowing a change of beneficiary by will is that the contract (policy) itself may require that the
change be made before death. 10 Whether or not such a contract may exist
depends upon the circumstances of the case and how the court construes
the language of the policy. In the Suga case, despite plaintiff's arguments
to the contrary, the court interpreted the policy as providing for an exclusive method for a change of beneficiary. Thus the attempt to change
by a method other than the one stated in the policy failed.
The vesting theory (though accepted by the majority of jurisdictions)
has nonetheless been a subject of controversy. One objection is that though
a will is ordinarily effective upon death, a provision changing the beneficiary is an expression of a change made during the lifetime of the insured." A second objection is that where both the vesting and the will
become effective upon death,12 the will should prevail, since it is the insured's last expression of intent.1 8 But in the Suga case, neither of these
objections were directly considered by the court. The court instead held
that the policy required the request to become effective on the date of
execution, and that a will is not executory until death; after death, the
14
vesting predominated over the will.
Besides these objections, there is authority that a change by will is allowed where the method is not exclusive,15 because the: provisions are for
the benefit of the insurer and may be waived by him.1 8 Under this theory,
a beneficiary cannot properly contend that the policy provisions have not
been met; only the insurer may take advantage of these provisions. By
10 Strohsahl, Ex'r. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y., 71 N.J. Super. 300, 176 A. 2d
814 (1962).
11 See Stone v. Stephens, 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E. 2d 766 (1951) (dissenting opinion,
Stewart, J.). Accord, United States v. Pahmer, 238 F. 2d 431 (2d Cir. 1956). The court
in the Pabmer case said, at 431, "To say that 'X, a substituted beneficiary, shall receive
the insurance on my death' is in legal effect the same as to say that 'X is hereby designated as my substituted beneficiary.' We hold here that the intent to substitute the
mother as beneficiary was not ineffective because accompanied by an expression of
intent that the change should not take effect until the death of the insured."
12 Note that this objection may not be raised if the beneficiary's interest is considered
vested subject to divestment as in the Strobsabl case. Strohsahl, Ex'r. v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y., 71 N.J. Super. 300, 176 A. 2d 814 (1962).
18 Pedron v. Olds, 193 Ark. 1026, 105 S.W. 2d 70 (1937); See also Stone v. Stephens,

155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E. 2d 766 (1951).
14 A third objection, besides those mentioned above, is that'since the insured can
defeat the beneficiary's interest n many ways, lapse of payments or assignment, for
example, there is no reason why he cannot do it by will. Supra.
15 The court held that there was an exclusive method in the Suga case, omitting the

case from the permissive rule. But a study of the cases which used the rule shows that
the court could have held otherwise.
16
COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INsuRANcE LAW 149 (2d ed. 1959).
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paying the proceeds into court, he waives his right to do so. 1 7 It has been
said that if a court assumes that the policy provisions relating to change
of beneficiary are for the benefit of the insurer, it cannot make a conclusive case for substantial compliance.18 One case does assert, however,
that though the provisions are for the benefit of the insurer, the beneficiary's rights are established by the vesting of the proceeds in him upon
death, so that the will is nonetheless ineffective. 19 Another argument is
that the insurer cannot, by waiving his own rights, waive the rights of
others. 20 It is also to be noted here that where the provisions are considered
to be for the benefit of both the insurer and the last beneficiary, substan21
tial compliance can be required.
The authority for permitting a change of beneficiary by will may possibly receive a new impetus from a recent federal decision involving a
Federal Employees Group Life Policy.22 The decision in this case was
based upon several decisions under National Life Insurance (servicemen)
which allowed a change by will. Quoting another case, the court said:
But in the field of National Life Insurance the cases are legion which hold
that in judging the efficacy of an attempted change of beneficiary the courts
brush aside all legal technicalities in order to effectuate the manifest intent of
the insured. 2. 3. . This case may be cited as typical of this long, unbroken, line

of authority.

Of course, even in these cases, the manifest intent alone is insufficient;
there must be an affirmative act in pursuance of the intent.2 4 -It has also
been made very clear that this is federal and not state law; first, because
the insurance is based on a federal statute, and second, because there is a
need for uniformity of the law dealing with federal insurance. 2 But the
17 Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 160 F. Supp. 292 (D.C. Puerto Rico 1958);
Stone v. Stephens, 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E. 2d 766 (1951) (dissenting opinion, Zimmer-

man, J.).
18 Note, 37

CoRNL

L.Q. 305.

19 See Parks' Exrs. v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435, 156 S.W. 2d 480 (1941).
20 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 307 Ill. App. 652, 30 N.E. 2d 937 (1940).
21 Creighton v. Barnes, 152 Tex. 309, 257 S.W. 2d 101 (1953), quoting Kotch v. Kotch,
151 Tex. 471, 251 S.W. 2d 520 (1952).
22 See Austin v. Sears, 180 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1960); aff'd 292 F. 2d 690 (9th Cir.
1961); cert. denied 368 U.S. 929 (1961).
23 United States v. Pahmer, 238 F. 2d 431, 431 (2d Cir. 1956) quoting Roberts v.
United States, 157 F. 2d 906, 909 (4th Cir. 1946), cert. denied 330 U.S. 829 (1947). The
following cases to the same effect were footnoted: Kell v. United States, 202 F. 2d 143
(5th Cir. 1953); Moths v. United States, 179 F. 2d 824 (7th Cir. 1950); McKewen v.
McKewen, 165 F. 2d 761 (5th Cir. 1948); Johnson v. White, 39 F. 2d 793 (8th Cir. 1930).
But see note, 2 A.L.R. 2d 489 (1948).
24 Lane v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 606 (W.D.S.C. 1953).
25

Austin v. Sears, 292 F. 2d 690 (9th Cir. 1961); cert. denied 368 U.S. 929 (1961).
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court in this case
deemed the insured's will a "reasonable effort" to change
26
the beneficiary.
Nevertheless, there is question as to whether this case is a good precedent for permitting a change of beneficiary by will. The defendant did
not claim as a designated beneficiary, but rather as the person entitled to
take the policy proceeds in the absence of a designated beneficiary. Thus
an important factor was that the will did not truly change the beneficiary,
but rather that it designated one for the first time. Also, the decision of
27
the case was almost immediately rejected by another court.
Many federal decisions recognize that the manifested intent of the insured is the determining consideration. Besides being one of the basic legal
arguments to permit change of beneficiary by will, it also is a moral factor
which the court must consider. One often quoted Arkansas decision declares that ". . . this being the insured's last expression on the subject, it
ought to control. '28 In answer, it was said that where no steps are taken
to comply with the policy provisions, the expressed purpose is an unexecuted intention and accomplishes nothing.2 9 Nevertheless, the insured
keeps the policy in force and pays the premiums, and his last wish should
be respected30 Furthermore, an expression of intention documented in a
3
will is much more convincing than any informal writing would be. '
These arguments between strict construction on the one hand and the
insured's intention on the other are still highly controverted. Whether the
courts are finally learning to support the intention is something to be determined at a future date.
Sears v. Austin, 180 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
See Breckline v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 40 Pa. 573, 178 A. 2d 748 (1962). (Held:
The policy provisions were statutory and could not be waived). Note that if subsequent
decisions show that the rules applicable to Federal Employee's Life Insurance, as with
National Life Insurance, are not applicable to private commercial insurance, the precedent of the Sears case will be valid only within this narrow sphere of insurance created
by federal statute, if at all.
2
s Pedron v. Olds, 193 Ark. 1026, 1030, 105 S.W. 2d 70, 72 (1937) (Emphasis added).
29
Parks' Ex'rs. v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435, 156 S.W. 2d 480 (1941).
S0 Stone v. Stephens, 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E. 2d 766 (1951), (dissenting opinion,
Zimmerman, J.).
31 Ibid. (dissenting opinion, Stewart, J.).
26
27

LABOR-EXTENSION OF THE ENTITY CONCEPT TO
ALLOW RECOVERY TO UNION MEMBERS IN
TORT ACTIONS AGAINST UNION
The defendant union, an unincorporated association, maintained a parking lot adjacent to its meeting hall as an accommodation for its members.

